RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN HAITI

GRESSIER – HAITI, 20, 21, 22 JUNE 2006

International workshop coorganized by

Development and Civilizations Lebret-Irfed international Centre

and

Karl Lévêque Cultural Institute

ACTION DE CAREME

This report is also available in Creole and Spanish.
Please contact either the centre Développement et Civilisations - Lebret-Irfed or the Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque (ICKL)

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CONTENTS

LIST OF ANNEXES

I. ORGANISERS

The Centre Développement et Civilisations - Lebret-Irfed

The Centre Développement et Civilisations Lebret-Irfed (DCLI) [1], based in France, defines itself as an international network of people in the field of development who are engaged in work to transform society, aiming to:
- work towards balanced, supportive and sustainable development, in which all development is people-centred[2];
- enable the people to play a role in developing their own economic, social, cultural and spiritual future;
- set development projects in a local, regional and global vision.

By organising international meetings and workshops, the Centre enables field-workers from very different geographical, social and cultural backgrounds to share their experiences. The meetings are founded on action research methodology.
The Centre stimulates critical thinking and gives a voice to research through a monthly journal, ***Développement et civilisations,*** [3] an information centre, conferences, and a portal website. Training is also offered to address the uncertainties and fulfil the practical needs of those working in the development field.

The Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque (ICKL)

The Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque [4] is a non-denominational not-for-profit Haitian private foundation, which has no links with any political party. Created in July 1989, the ICKL defines itself as a centre for critical thought, social analysis and popular education, which aims to cont-ribute to the struggle for liberation of the lower classes of society through theoretical reflection and analysis, and by supporting grass-roots groups. Its aims are to:
- share in the urgent task of thinking through politics in Haiti;
- throw some light on the practical and theoretical obstacles faced by the popular movement;
- help establish an independent, structured setting in which to fight for these goals.

It seeks to promote the development of a critical consciousness within the popular movement and to encourage people across the country and in other parts of the world to share their experiences, endeavours and organisational practices. To achieve this, it produces and distributes educ-ational tools for use by grassroots organis-ations.

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[1] Louis-Joseph Lebret (1897-1966) was a Dominican priest and one of the pioneers of Human Economics. Founder of the journal *Economie et Humanisme*, [Economy and Humanism], economics expert with the newly-established UNCTAD (1964), adviser to the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), inspiration behind and co-editor of the Encyclical Populorum Progressio (1967), he was both a thinker and researcher, and a man of action. He set up and for nearly 10 years (1958-1966) directed IRFED (Institut International de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Développement Harmonisé) [the International Institute for Research and Training for Harmonized Development], to give a reality to his vision of human economics at international level, implementing large-scale development planning projects in Lebanon, Senegal and Brazil, and organising a training course in development in Paris, which was to welcome students from around the world. Développement et Civilisations – Lebret-Irfed is a continuation of the IRFED created in 1958 par by Louis-Joseph Lebret, and of the L.-J. Lebret International Centre.

[2] Le développement de tout l'homme et de tous les hommes [Developing the whole person and every person]

[3] Until March 2006 the title was *Foi et développement* [Faith and Development]

[4] Born at Cap-Haitien, Karl Lévêque was a Jesuit priest and Doctor of Philosophy. He left the country for his noviciate during the François Duvalier regime. After Duvalier fell, he stayed briefly in Haiti, preparing to return to the country permanently, but unfortunately his death prevented him from seeing Haiti again. During his exile, he became involved with the Haitian community in Montreal in the struggle against the Duvalier regime, and played an active role in leading the revolutionary organisation *En Avant* [forwards]. His talks on Radio CIBL were renowned for the subtlety of his analysis.

II. PARTICIPANTS

More than 40 participants[5] attended the workshop:

- one or two representatives from the 13 grassroots organisations and support NGOs which had taken part in the preliminary survey during the Summer of 2005;

- some organisations that had not taken part in the survey, but which were invited by the co-organisers, DCLI or ICKL;

- two people from the Dominican Republic, representing:
    - an educational support NGO,
    - a participative experiment in relations between civil society and the public authorities;

- a Cuban researcher, a member of the DCLI international network;

- the contributors:
    - Laënnec Hurbon, professor at Quisqueya University, Port-au-Prince, and research director at the CNRS,[6] Paris,
    - Camille Chalmers, director of PAPDA,[7]
    - Marc-Arthur Fils-Aimé, director of the Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque,
    - Necker Dessables, Ombudsman,
    - Jean-Rénol Elie, decentralisation specialist,
    - André Lafontant Joseph, decentralisation specialist and writer of draft law proposals on this issue,
    - Jorge Balbis, from Uruguay, executive secretary of ALOP,[8] and DCLI Vice-President for Latin America.

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[5] See full list of participants at Annexe 1.
[6] Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris [National Scientific Research Centre]
[7] Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif [Haitian Platform for the Advocacy of Alternative Development].
[8] Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción [Latin American Association of Promotion Organisations]

III. PROGRAMME

19 June

Arrival of participants at Gressier

20 June

Welcome and introduction of participants
Introduction of the co-organisers:
. Développement et Civilisations - Lebret-Irfed
. Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque
Opening of the workshop; overview of history and objectives

Review of the survey

The survey in the context and circumstances of Haiti
Contributions:
Laënnec Hurbon, Camille Chalmers, Marc-Arthur Fils-Aimé,
Necker Dessables.
Debates

21 June

Summary of the first day's work and debate

An example of relations between civil society and the public authorities in the Dominican Republic
Contribution from Marcos Nunez and Manuel Gil

Group discussions: pathways and priorities

Decentralisation:
Contribution from Jean Rénol Elie

22 June

Summary of the second day's work and debate

Decentralisation continued:
Contribution from André Lafontant Joseph

Haiti in the Latin American and Caribbean context
Contribution from Jorge Balbis

Assessment of the workshop by the participants and closure of the workshop
Departure of participants

IV. HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES OF THE WORKSHOP

DCLI and its network members have been organising meetings on the **Dialogue of civilisations** and on the **Relationship between civil society and the public authorities** since 2001[9]. Seminars have been held in Ethiopia, Libya, the Czech Republic and India. Others are being prepared (Democratic Republic of Congo and Uruguay).

In 2002, Haitian members of the network drew up a plan to hold a critical thinking session on the relationship between civil society and the public authorities, with the following objectives:

- to learn from experiences of promoting democratic participation among the population at the local level;
- to use these experiences as the basis for practical proposals for devising public policies that take the local people into account (especially **decentralisation policies**);
- to set this dynamic in a national, regional and international context;
- to benefit from sessions on the same theme run by DCLI in other parts of the world and to inform participants from these other areas about the work in Haiti.

These objectives would be achieved through:

- a first stage: a survey to gather a series of experiences – from different regions of Haiti and in various fields of work – to illustrate the reality of relations between civil society and the public authorities at the local level;
- a second stage: a critical thinking workshop including, among others, the organisations that had taken part in the survey, to analyse the experiences presented and put forward criteria for improving democratic practice.

However, a series of environmental and political events in Haiti meant that the project could not take place during the period originally proposed (2002-2003). The survey[10] finally took place in July-August 2005 and the workshop in June 2006.

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[9] In October 2001, in partnership with the Economic Commission for Africa, the Centre Lebret organised a seminar at Addis Ababa in Ethiopia entitled: Société civile, développement local et mondialisation – Le cas des Pays les Moins Avancés (PMA). [Civil society, local development and globalization – the case of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)]

[10] Pierre Enocque François, from Haiti, and Vincent Diop, from Senegal, gathered the data between 5 July and 10 August 2005 from 13 local organisations and/or support NGOs; the survey report is available on request.

V. STAGES OF THE WORKSHOP

All participants agreed that the workshop was a real **step forward**, in terms of both the deliberations and the identification of priorities. A summary of the different phases of the workshop follows. You will find the contributions in the annexe.

Recap of the preliminary survey

A year went by between the survey and the workshop. The information was not out of date, but it was necessary to refresh participants' memories so that it could be used as the basis for the workshop. Besides, some participants were unaware or not fully aware of it. It was essential to spend some time on familiarisation with the survey report.

The aim of this stage was therefore to **recap** and summarise the main points for the participants. Led by Vincent Diop and Pierre Enocque François, it enabled the participants to **assimilate** the common foundation on which the workshop was to be built.

Going back over the survey showed clearly that the peasant farmers' organisations, which represent the excluded and marginalised majority of the population, are basically saying: "we do not know the State and the State does not know us". This state of affairs can be explained by history, but is it set in stone? Are people in civil society and the public authorities, whose work is nevertheless related, condemned to turn their backs on each other?

The broader view offered by the contributors

The information collected – although very valuable as evidence – is nevertheless local, partial, and related to a specific sector. To use it in a case study, it had to be set in the national context and circumstances. Four contributors, Laënnec Hurbon, Camille Chalmers, Marc-Arthur Fils-Aimé and Necker Dessables, undertook the task, bringing in elements of Haitian history, culture, economics and politics. Taking this step back set the local stories in a broader context, relating them to each other and making them part of a **whole**, providing the key to understanding and a gateway to debate. This broader approach to case studies gives a wider meaning and more impact to everyday, local initiatives.

What emerges here is that the exclusion and marginalisation of the majority, accompanied by mass illiteracy, produce a feeling of victimisation, which is assimilated and internalised, preventing the development of an awareness of citizenship based on knowledge of rights and duties.

An example of participative democracy in the Dominican Republic

What is still only a prospect in Haiti is already becoming a reality in the Dominican Republic: Marcos Nunez and Manuel Gil gave the example of a local elected representative who reached a territorial management position thanks to popular education and long-term organisation.

Participative democracy, in which local elected representatives take account of the opinions mediated by organisations involved in community action, is beginning to become a reality in the Dominican Republic. This situation underlines the essential role played by the popular education programmes being run for several decades now, in bringing forward people from organised civil society who are able to build local government based on the population, their needs and priorities.

Identifying challenges, priorities, pathways for action, and perspectives

Having heard the survey report, the contributors' presentations, and the debates that followed, the participants worked in groups to identify common challenges.

The group was thus able to really assimilate the common heritage of experiences, beliefs and uncertainties, before turning to the issues of the decentralisation policy to be put in place in Haiti, which is part of the move towards participative democracy that is under way throughout Latin America.

Studying the decentralisation proposals

Two specialists in decentralisation policy, Jean-Rénol Elie and André-Lafontant Joseph, explained what we should understand by decentralisation and what opportunities it can offer for building democracy at the local level.

*It emerged from the presentations and debates that followed, that there are legal mechanisms which can offer **a real opportunity for people to participate** at the local level. These opportunities are already written into the 1987 Constitution, which offers a little known institutional framework for democratic participation from the bottom up. Since then, laws[11] have been passed during the transition period, but they have not yet been promulgated. It is now up to those working in civil society to give life to this institutional framework that exists on paper. This could be by setting up training schemes on the subject for both civil society workers and local elected representatives.*

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[11] - decree defining the general framework for decentralisation, and the functional and organisational principles of local government in Haiti;
  - decree dealing with the organisation and functioning of communes;
  - decree dealing with the organisation and functioning of communal sections.

Haiti in the Latin American and Caribbean regional context

Generally speaking, Haiti does not know much about the Latin American - Caribbean region, and conversely the Latin American - Caribbean region does not know much about Haiti!
Jorge Balbis, coordinator of the ALOP network (Latin American Association of Promotion Organisations) in which 60 NGOs from 19 countries in the region take part, painted a vivid picture of changes in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last 40 years.

The fate of Haiti – specific though it is – must not be excluded from the history and development of the Latin American and Caribbean region. Individual as it may be, it is still connected to that of the region, and the worrying trends seen there are common to all.

On-the-spot assessment

In a brief assessment phase, the participants expressed their general satisfaction. They also highlighted the spirit of participation shown by everyone, the quality of the contributions, the openness towards other cultural realities, and a pleasant atmosphere.
The participants from the Dominican Republic recalled the complex and interdependent relationship between their country and Haiti. Efforts are in fact under way to make it easier for the two peoples to meet, especially by creating regular opportunities for joint reflection between the two nations.
Jorge Balbis, DCLI's Vice-President for Latin America and the Caribbean, said he "had taken part in a very valuable exchange of experiences and critical thinking; he had discovered an active civil society, and the prospect of joint fields of action and partnerships to be developed between Haiti and the rest of Latin America".

A few regrets

Participants regretted, however, that:

- very few women were present. Although the contribution of women is a determining factor in the economy, especially the informal economy, in survival strategies, and in bringing up children, they are still rarely represented at meetings. This is seen both in their almost total absence from the survey, and in the fact that very few women attended the workshop (owing to inattention to methodology regarding the male-female balance, or to problems of parity within the organisations themselves?);

- some organisations that had contributed to the survey were not present;

- some participants were not well informed about the survey; in some cases, although their organisation had taken part in the survey, the people attending the workshop were not those involved in the survey, and were in fact poorly prepared. If each organisation had taken steps to prepare for the workshop, this failing could have been avoided.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
Synthesis of debates and contributions

These are the key issues identified during the course of the debates that followed the contributions.
(see contributions transcriptions in annexes)

Haitian context

The very concept of civil society

Remaining vigilant about the concept of civil society, a very ambiguous one. So to avoid any confusion we prefer to speak of a *société civile d'en bas*, or **grassroots civil society.**

popular education

Using both formal and popular education to teach individuals about the rights and duties of participation in building a country.

"NGO-isation"

Remaining vigilant about the phenomenon of NGO-isation: support NGOs tend to draw in the social movement, separating it from grassroots dynamics. When they finance projects, they often impose their own point of view and logic of action.

popular movement and political tools

Strengthening an independent popular movement which can create its own political tools and will not be taken over by the traditional political parties.

channelling efforts into common objectives

In the face of a "Balkanisation" of the popular movements (multiplication of NGOs, Churches and unconcerted sources of external support), channelling efforts into common objectives so that significant initiatives can be carried through as part of a national project.

Networking

Ending the isolation of groups and giving them a place in a broader context, at national or international level.

Decentralisation and financial resources

Fighting to make sure that decentralisation includes a genuine transfer of administrative competencies and human and financial resources to the local level.

National sovereignty

Participants frequently criticised the presence, excessive cost and ineffectiveness of MINUSTAH in Haiti. Its presence threatens the independence and national sovereignty of the country. More broadly, all mechanisms of foreign intervention, including economic ones, came in for lively criticism from a great many participants.

Decentralisation in Haiti

Opportunities do exist

The contributions from the two decentralisation specialists showed that despite the extent to which most of the population is excluded, the situation is not hopelessly blocked. Settings do exist in which democracy can be built from the bottom upwards; the Constitution and some decrees set out legal mechanisms that encourage participative democracy, but for the most part the opportunities that these laws offer are still poorly understood. There is still a lot to be learnt, both on the part of the public authorities and that of the social organisations. The latter are perfectly able to take initiatives to encourage local authorities to start moving in this direction.

Distinguishing between decentralisation and privatisation

It is still important to make sure that decentralisation and privatisation are not confused. Decentralisation does not mean the state should be allowed to reduce its role, but to play its role in a different way. Decentralisation can strengthen the power of the communes from the bottom upwards. And local democracy can feed into national democracy.

Decentralisation involves human and budgetary resources

There can be no real decentralisation without a transfer of human and budgetary resources. Very often, attempts at decentralisation fail because the State transfers its responsibilities to the local authorities without at the same time transferring human and budgetary resources.

The risk of fragmentation of development projects caused by international decentralised cooperation

Vigilance is needed on the issue of fragmentation of aid provided through decentralised cooperation. There are many sources of financial support from other countries, and they answer to different rules, and do not play a concerted role as part of an overall development plan for Haiti. The example of France is revealing: each local authority may support a project in one decentralised region or another of Haiti. Unless efforts are concerted, unless there is an overall vision, such a dispersal of effort cannot bring real results and risks generating a situation of inequality between people in different regions.

Democracy-building

A setting exists for democracy-building but doing it requires:

- building an awareness of citizenship that involves rights and duties;

- a rehabilitation of local government powers;

- a great deal of educational work.

The Latin American and Caribbean regional process

Local development and overall political plan

The battle for democracy is a horizon, towards which we must advance step by step, with very practical objectives, and sometimes by taking a step backwards. Another world is possible, but it is long term work, practical work that means something to people. Local development that proposes an economic content and is driven by an overall political plan is one way forward.
This is illustrated by the battle in Latin America against the privatisation of water. Implementing this privatisation is a disaster, because it threatens the access of the poor to an essential service. There have been numerous concerted reactions from civil society, and in some cases we have seen a return to management as a public service.

Education and social movement

The historical summary the contributor gave us showed the importance of the process of education, awareness raising and training of the organised sectors of civil society, in order to understand the complex macro-processes and make effective practices part of them.
Without this, there is a strong risk that history will repeat itself, with a return to hard-line governments and chaos. In Brazil, change was born out of groups that built themselves a strong capacity for critical thinking, comprehension and analysis, particularly rural communities. The social movement is the key to any move to raise awareness and create and strengthen the awareness of citizenship.

Bringing together organisations and common objectives for social progress

Establishing links and connections between social movements that share objectives and a common agenda heightens the impact of practices to promote social change. The people must be able to decide which social movements and which

NGOs they want to work with, and which not, according to their stance and their independence from the mechanisms of neoliberalism. NGO is not in itself a synonym for social progress, in the same way that social movement is not a synonym for popular movement.

A word of hope: the darkest hour is just before the dawn.

What next?

The participants stressed that the workshop results deserved a wider audience. It is also important to ensure they are followed up, and that initiatives are identified with the aim of turning the proposals expressed at the meeting into reality.
The main recommendations expressed by the participants included improving relations between the peoples of the region, continuing the fight against illiteracy, developing civic awareness, and not expecting the public authorities to do everything in starting to build democratic participation from the bottom upwards.

A recommendation

Among these recommendations, one is considered to be a priority. This is identifying, supporting and publicising, within popular movements, examples of constructive relationships at local level, between civil society and the public authorities.

The last word goes to Necker Dessables: "it's as if Karl Lévêque himself were here!"

ANNEXE 1
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

ALONSO	Aurelio	Casa de las Américas		Cuba	www.casa.cult.cu
ARISTIL	Jean Claudy	Vwa Klodi Mizo	VKM	Haïti	
BALBIS	Jorge	Asociacion Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promocion Popular	ALOP	Costa Rica	www.alop.or.cr
CHALMERS	Camille	Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif	PAPDA	Haïti	www.papda.org
COLAS	Jocelyne	Justice et Paix		Haïti	
DANIER	Dieunord	Federasyon Groupman Peyisan Belle-Fontaine	FGPB	Haïti	
DESSABLES	Necker	Office du Protecteur du Citoyen	OPC	Haïti	
DIOP	Vincent	Développement et Civilisations - Lebret-Irfed	DCLI	France	www.lebret-irfed.org
DUPUCH	Frantz	(traducteur)			
DUQUESNE	Isabelle	Développement et Civilisations - Lebret-Irfed	DCLI	France	www.lebret-irfed.org
ELIE	Jean Rénol			Haïti	
ESTEUS	Sony	Sosyete Animasyon Kominikasyon Sosyal	SAKS	Haïti	www.saks-haiti.org
FILS-AIME	Marc-Arthur	Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque	ICKL	Haïti	www.ickl-haiti.org
FRANCOIS	Pierre Enocque	Développement et Civilisations - Lebret-Irfed	DCLI	France	www.lebret-irfed.org
FRANCOIS	Grégoire	Justice et Paix		Haïti	
GELIN	Marie Anne	Fonds International de Développement Economique et Social	FIDES	Haïti	
GIL	Manuel	Ayuntamiento municipal de Ayaguate		République dominicaine	
HURBON	Laënnec	Université Quisqueya, Port-au-Prince CNRS, Paris	UNIQ	Haïti	
JEAN BAPTISTE	Rosnel	Tèt Kole	TK	Haïti	
JEAN BAPTISTE	Yves	Sosyete Animasyon Kominikasyon Sosyal	SAKS	Haïti	www.saks-haiti.org
JEAN-FRANCOIS	Lenz	Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque	ICKL	Haïti	www.ickl-haiti.org

JEROME	Lina	Fonds International de Développement Economique et Social	FIDES	Haïti	
JOSEPH	André Lafontant	Groupe de Recherche et d'Interventions en Développement et en Education	GRIDE	Haïti	
JOSEPH BIENNEUS	Monique	Federasyon Groupman Peyisan Belle-Fontaine	FGPB	Haïti	
LADOUCEUR	Anice	Programme d'Appui à l'Insertion Sociale	PAIS	Haïti	
LOUBERT	Charles	Tèt Kole	TK	Haïti	
MARCELIN	Jackson	Lakombit		Haïti	
MATHIEU	Edmond	Mouvman Peyizan Papay	MPP	Haïti	
MOLEON	Albert	Sosyete Animasyon Kominikasyon Sosyal	SAKS	Haïti	www.saks-haiti.org
MORENCY	Mercidieu	Tèt Kole	TK	Haïti	
MORTIME	Antonal	Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés	GARR	Haïti	www.garr-haiti.org
NUNEZ PEGUERO	Marcos	Centro Dominicano de Estudio de la Educacion	CEDEE	République dominicaine	
PARES CANELA	Rosa	Action de Carême Suisse - Fastenopfer		Haïti	
PIERRE LOUIS	Muller	Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque	ICKL	Haïti	www.ickl-haiti.org
SAINT PIERRE	Marius	Federasyon Groupman Peyisan Belle-Fontaine	FGPB	Haïti	
SAINTVIL	Luc		OXFAM	Haïti	
SAINVIL	Julien	Etudiant de la Faculté des Sciences Humaines / Etudiant Stagiaire de l'ICKL	FASCH	Haïti	
THOMAS	Pierre Richard	Collectif de l'Education pour un Développement Alternatif	CEDAL	Haïti	
THOMAS	Jean Wilner	Kombit Peyisan Nip	KPN	Haïti	
THOMMEN	Marlyse	Développement et Civilisations - Lebret-Irfed	DCLI	France	www.lebret-irfed.org
VITAL	Raoul	Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque	ICKL	Haïti	www.ickl-haiti.org
VIXAMAR	André	Tèt Kole Nodwes	TKN	Haïti	
WILLARD	Vancol	Institut de Technologie et d'Animation	ITECA	Haïti	

Review of the survey and the conditions in which it was conducted

Network members involved in the preliminary stages had said that despite difficult relations between civil society and the public authorities generally, there were nevertheless some innovative local experiments in democratic participation in Haiti. They suggested identifying a selection of these experiments, interviewing those involved, and recording their narratives. The records would then serve as an aid to understanding the mechanisms at work in these experiments, and a source from which proposals could be drawn for wider application.

The conditions in which the survey was conducted (tense political situation, assassinations and kidnappings, especially in the capital) meant that the interviewers had to go first and foremost to those areas they could reach without undue physical risk,[12] perhaps to the detriment of places where they would have found achievements that were closer to the target objective. Despite the difficulties, the interviewers recorded thirteen of these experiences in six weeks, in a variety of fields of work and taking place in different regions.

Recap of the survey

As regards the type of Haitian organisations invited to take part, they included:
-    five representative peasant farmers' organisations, well established in different regions: the **FGPB** (Fédération des Groupements Paysans de Belle Fontaine) [federation of Belle Fontaine peasant farmers' groups], **KPN** (Konbit Peyzan Nip) [Nippes peasant farmers' work group], **TKN** (Tèt Kole Nord-Ouest)

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[12] With the help of ICKL – who provided the logistical and methodological framework – the interviewers were able to draw up three lists of organisations to contact, and compare them for value, accessibility and risks involved, before taking the decisions.

[solidarity North-West], **MPP** (Mouvement Paysan de Papaye) [Papaye rural movement];

-    one national human rights organisation, active in both rural and urban areas: the **Commission Nationale Justice et Paix**, [National Justice and Peace Commission];

-    one national women's organisation, mainly active in urban areas: **SOFA** (Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn) [Haitian women's solidarity];

-    one community radio station and one organisation supporting community radio stations: **VKM** (Radyo Vwa Klodi Mizo) [Radio "voice of Klodi Mizo"] and **SAKS** (Sosyete Animasyon Kominikasyon Sosyal) [social coordination and communication society];

-    two initiatives working with street children in an urban environment: **TIMCATEC** and **CEP** (Centre d'Education Populaire) [popular education centre];

-    finally, a few intermediary organisations that support popular and peasant farmers' organisations round off the list: **La Combite** [the work group], **OXFAM Haiti, and ICKL.**

The report brings out very clearly the strong feeling of exclusion felt by poor rural populations. In most cases the State does not exist for them. Essential services (roads, health, education, etc.) do not reach the people, and it is civil society, in varying degrees of organisation, that must take the place of the public authorities.

As far as their relationship with the public authorities is concerned, local, popular and peasant farmers' organisations can be divided into three categories:
-    those that have no relations at all with the public authorities and do not even want them;

- those for whom the existence of the State has manifested itself only through the acts of violence it has committed against them;
- those that have tried to establish relations but without success.

Anti-State reflexes are common, because it is regarded as a looter and a source of exclusion, perpetrating extraordinary acts of violence against its own people: a State that is the enemy of the Nation.

Only a few national and international support NGOs have a more or less established relationship with the public authorities, and in these cases it is generally with the central State and the ministries.

In the survey report, the most successful form was that of Oxfam Haiti, which has given an impetus to a network of coffee cooperatives in the North, with the aim of promoting the development of coffee growing, improvements in quality, and the organising of marketing. Oxfam Haiti was the instigator of the Haitian Coffee Institute (INCAH), which brings together coffee producers, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of the Environment, Haiti State University, the Banque Nationale de Crédit [national credit bank], and other NGOs that are able to provide different services, particularly in the fields of training and mediation.

The participants were very interested in this model, but it raised quite a few questions. In particular we may ask how this experiment will progress while still remaining equitable, and of benefit to the rural population, without itself becoming a source of inequality and a means of enriching some at the expense of others.

The report also highlights the following phenomenon: as a result of being excluded, the lower classes, especially the rural population, appear to put themselves in the position of victim, and once settled in to their marginalised position, they seem to give up any real desire to escape from their state of exclusion.

It also underlines the very strong call for justice on the part of the organisations questioned, their demand for a democratic State, and the force for change that popular education represents. Education is in any case a fundamental dimension for all the organisations we met. "We demand popular education as the foundation of the development process: education to understand society, to achieve justice and human rights, and to make local development a reality".

On many of these aspects, the participants from the Dominican Republic saw a parallel with the situation of civil society in relation to the State in their country.

Despite certain limitations, mainly due to the difficult conditions in which the survey was conducted, the small number of organisations surveyed, and a methodological design that left too little room for overall analysis, the survey report created a sufficient basis on which participants could begin building the workshop.

ANNEXE 3
THE HAITIEN CONTEXT AS SEEN BY THE CONTRIBUTORS

Contributions from Laënnec Hurbon, Camille Chalmers, Marc-Arthur Fils-Aimé, and Necker Dessables

CONTRIBUTION FROM LAËNNEC HURBON[13]

The nature of the State

In Haiti, the State may be said to **function for its own ends;** it is a very unusual State. In order to understand this, we need to go back over history, especially to the 19th Century, when the State developed a form of **internal colonisation** of its own citizens. At the same time, it was creating an external image, and forming contacts with **the outside world** instead of with the local population, even less with the rural world. The entire policy of successive governments consisted not in devising a political plan that would enable the country to grow and develop, but in justifying its actions in the eye of the outside world. And we are still in this situation today: Haiti's policy is not decided according to the needs of the people, but with the international institutions in mind.

The State and the rural world

Over the course of its history, the face that the Haitian State has shown, especially in its relationship with the rural community, is that of an organisation, a structure that functions only for its own ends. To achieve this, the State has established a set of organisational systems and exclusion strategies which ensure that sectors that are vital for the people are controlled by a closed circle. This is why the State is seen as both a façade and a predator.

This practice has produced a habitus or mindset; the rural population becomes a part of this functioning, is "caught up" in it,

but cannot see how to escape from the situation of exclusion, unless by a massive exodus to the towns – where the rural population always has a transitory existence – particularly Port-au-Prince, or by leaving Haiti altogether.

Particularly excluded, the rural community becomes turned in on a feeling of victimhood, and reacts by limiting or rejecting altogether any relationship with the State. It becomes aware that it forms a "separate world". The idea of "**elsewhere"** then becomes overvalued. The nature of the State has led the peasant farmers not only to become closed in on their sense of victimisation, and a desire to get away, but also to develop a strategy of existing "outside" the State, and denying it access to their social space. Excluded, they reject the State and can see no way out except either indifference, or struggle and confrontation.

Religions and the NGOs

In this context, religions and the NGOs can play a major role. It is one of substitution, to make up for the shortcomings of the State: on the one hand, they set themselves up as an authority in the eyes of the people; on the other, they offer the chance of a "mental escape" from their isolation. The rural community is susceptible to religions and ready to welcome them all. Religion provides a history, one which is independent of a national setting, a way out. Thanks to religion, peasant farmers can live "elsewhere" in their own country.

When they are regarded as a substitute for the State, NGOs can reinforce exclusion from the State. This way of acting has real repercussions on individuals' lives, on their initiatives and how they place themselves in relation to the State and the world. Religions can create spheres of influence, and can fragment and disperse groups;

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[13] Laënnec Hurbon is a Professor at Quisqueya University at Port-au-Prince, research director at the CNRS (Centre National de Recherche Scientifique) in Paris, Doctor of Theology (Institut Catholique de Paris) and of Sociology (Sorbonne University, Paris), a specialist in the relationship between religion, culture and politics in the Caribbean, and the author of several books.

NGOs can create – each in its own domain and its own area – mini States under their influence, leading to a weakening of the national collective consciousness.

The problem then posed by the presence and activities of religions and the NGOs is that they help exaggerate the feeling of victimhood in which the popular movements have become enclosed, without improving awareness of the rights and duties of the individual. The peasant farmers, seeing themselves as victims, are not necessarily aware of their rights and duties, which is precisely what it means to be a citizen; and it is this that helps to keep them excluded!

The place of education in citizenship

A citizen is someone who is aware of their rights and duties. Without awareness of rights and duties there is no citizenship. This is why education is important in bringing the rural community to a national consciousness, an awareness that they live in the same country. You cannot make a people of citizens out of a people of illiterates.

To build relationships between citizens, and between civil society and government, it is important to work on memory. Recalling history will help people realise that we are all part of the same country. We must be aware that we are all part of the same country, and that all citizens are equal.

There are some significant expressions in this respect; they are used to divide a whole into parts. For instance, people talk about "developing the rural world", as if the rural world were not related to the rest of the country. It is not a matter of the peasant community on one side, and the authorities on the other, or the town and the outside world on yet another side. The Haitian problem relates to the whole country, and it must move forward using a set of positive practices.

The local setting, the best place to build democracy

The relationship with the State is necessarily channelled through the local authorities. The local level is one of the places where the State can be reconstructed. The work of grassroots organisations can and must get involved in this channel, to make the local area a place of participation, a meeting place where each experience can be built on. Conditions must be created in which participation in local democracy is possible. Many people believe that change cannot happen, and the feeling of "victimhood" is difficult to root out. However, a demand does exist: we all know examples where it is the local population that has asked for a school, a hospital, even a police force.

To sum up

A setting exists for democracy-building, but doing it requires:

- building an awareness of citizenship that involves rights and duties;
- a rehabilitation of local government powers;
- a great deal of educational work.

CONTRIBUTION FROM CAMILLE CHALMERS[14]

Recent history

Between 1986 and 1991, there was a powerful groundswell; the popular movement was becoming a considerable force.
Then came the coup d'Etat and the massacres that came to a head in 1991. From 1991 to 1994, the popular movement was repressed. Sabotage, persecutions, forced migration, real destruction followed. Since 1995, there has been no mobilisation that has brought together a critical mass with clear objectives. This period has been characterised by lethargy, inaction, dispersal, and fragmentation. The strategy used by the State paid off, because it succeeded in preventing the popular movements from taking any significant action.
The grassroots organisations have become dependent on international NGOs to a large extent.

The demands and the nature of civil society organisations

The situation in this country is that civil society tends to reject the State, and finds it hard to conceive of the State as a partner. An example would be the grassroots organisations which refused to submit their projects to the town hall or to the members of their local CASEC[15]. The State has created a system of exclusion and in fact most of the population is excluded in this way. Society is trying to organise itself to consolidate its involvement in the development process. However, we should be asking whether the nature of these organisations is appropriate for the changes we want. There are many organisations (more than 100,000) carrying out all kinds of activities with "developmentist" characteristics.

There is a lesson to be learnt from the presidential election on 7 February 2006. The way the vote went expresses a kind of reclaiming of national sovereignty in the face of a situation where the international authorities had taken over. We wonder about the ability of society to keep up this claim and to resist any dynamic that shows a lack of respect for the social movement.

"A failed state"

We need to think about the concept of the "failed state" that the Bush administration is so fond of using. In 1995 a bureau was set up to look into the states that it declares to have failed, of which there are about 25. The issue of national reconstruction is planned from Washington's point of view, and is becoming a "business", and an opportunity for inter-national control.

There is an accumulation of facts to show how chaos and the mechanisms of chaos are produced; for instance in respect of numerous OAS [16] missions (more than twenty) that have failed, although OAS had other means it could have used, which could have brought results. So there is a strategy that aims to get into a situation where it can be claimed that a State has failed, and to declare it as such. We end up by accepting and "internalising" this discourse, and we have heard people saying things like "the situation in Haiti is even worse than in Darfur"!

Propaganda aimed at discrediting the country is circulating in the international community. We must fight an ideological battle to neutralise and deconstruct this discourse. In fact, this vision has its roots in the country's history. The colonising countries told themselves that the sons of slaves could not create a real nation. They did not regard the slaves' revolt that ended with independence for Haiti as a good example.

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[14] Camille Chalmers is director of the Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif [Haitian Platform for the Advocacy of Alternative Development].
[15] Conseil d'Administration des Sections Communales [Communal Section Administrative Council]

[16] **The Organisation of American States** (**OAS**) includes all the governments of the countries in the Americas. Foreign Ministers from across the continent meet once a year at the General Assembly, when the member states set themselves policies and objectives. The OAS has its headquarters at Washington, DC in the USA.

The presence of MINUSTAH

In this context, we should also ask ourselves what the presence of MINUSTAH[17] implies. A very lively debate is under way in Haiti about the UN Security Council decision to redeploy MINUSTAH, particularly whether it is in line with the international charter, which states in chapter VII the conditions for UN intervention. Understanding the presence of MINUSTAH means understanding the machinations of the imperialist countries: its presence can be seen as a factor in speeding up the process of applying the neoliberal model in Haiti.

The 520 million dollars a year spent on MINUSTAH, to little effect (so far it is said to have seized 250 weapons, when 160,000 illegal weapons are still circulating in the country), would be quite sufficient to train the Haitian police force.

In any case, the electoral success of 7 February 2006 is due to the mobilisation of Haitian society, and not to MINUSTAH.

The CCI (Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire) [ICF - Interim cooperation framework]

The Interim Cooperation Framework is also involved in accelerating the neoliberal process. We can take as an example the case of 7,500 hectares of land in fertile zones which are becoming "free zones". After 10 years, this zone will no longer be usable for agriculture. Haiti has become the top importer of rice from the United States, while the Artibonite plain could produce as much as the nation requires. We are now seeing the State of Haiti signing a number of agreements that are advantageous only to the North American government. Even the political plan of the new Haitian government, which is made up of 6 political parties, is based on elements of the neoliberal process.

Decentralisation is still a key issue. People talk about 200 years of the decentralisation process, but they always forget the North American occupation in 1915, when this process was blocked. Decentralisation is still a long way from what society expects. Most of the money is spent in Port-au-Prince. Only 1% of national budget expenditure goes through the local authorities. A mayor in a commune can do nothing without access to a budget allocated to the municipality. The battle for decentralisation is fundamental if the situation in Haiti is to change

CONTRIBUTION FROM MARC-ARTHUR FILS-AIME[18]

Return to the roots

The Nation and the State of Haiti had a painful birth. France lost Saint Domingue, the jewel in its colonial crown, after 13 long years of heroic struggle, from 14 August 1791 to 1 January 1804. Napoleon, the French ruling classes and the powers of the time were very unhappy at the birth of Haiti, as it was hostile to their interests and their manifest desire to maintain the slavery system.

The social makeup of the new country

Even before independence, the black and mulatto population included both slaves and freedmen. The freedmen enjoyed the benefits of liberty, and most of them were in a quite enviable financial position. A gaping void thus separated slaves from freedmen, who, thanks to the size of the economic interests most of them managed, now belonged to the same social classes as the colonists. Some of them were even slaveowners themselves. Since their wealth had not allowed them automatic entry to the social hierarchy that had been dominated by the white colonists until then, they demanded all the civic and political rights that went with their new class position.

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[17] Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti [United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti]

[18] Marc-Arthur Fils-Aimé is director of the Institut Culturel Karl Lévêque.

Attempts to re-establish slavery in its traditional form forced the new rich to escape the contempt of their former torturers by allying themselves with the anti-slavery fighters, whom they had previously called vagrants. The anti-slavery campaigners wanted to break down the entire colonial chain. Unfortunately, the experience the new rich had acquired in the expeditionary army made their task of regaining leadership of the struggle for total independence easier.

This division on the basis of immediate class interest among the former Africans or their descendants was not buried with the new alliance. In the short term this alliance seemed to be a salvation, but at the same time it carried within it the germs of an exclusion of the masses in the medium and long term. The suppression of class differences lasted only as long as the heat of the struggle for independence. Immediately after the official proclamation of victory over Napoleon's powerful army by the new leading elites, the new dominant classes used all their skills to claim the best and largest tracts of land for themselves. Using legal and administrative measures worthy of the colonial era, they drove the new peasant class into the Mornes and other less fertile areas. The new State took its first steps to exclude the vast majority of former slaves from their principal right, that of owning land in order to improve their lives and those of their families.

The substance of this social structure is still in place

This social structure still retains most of its initial characteristics. Successive governments of Haiti have changed little in the structure. The urban and rural masses are united by a common destiny in their shameful exploitation, even if the form this takes has varied with the times and the balance of power.

The economic foundations of the State

In former times, the State of Haiti depended mainly on food exports, in particular sugar and coffee. The *compradore* [19] sector of the bourgeoisie, which exercised a practically undivided hegemony over the whole of society, shared with the State the income extracted from the labour of small farmers.

Today, the State has become a state "on assistance", dependant for the majority of its expenses on the aforementioned international community. The taxes paid by those in a moderate to weak economic position are used to pay off the external debts that were contracted in their name, but from which they are the last to benefit. The welfare state has never existed here. This State has always been led by governments which prefer to live at the expense of the masses, with the help of all sort of tax regimes and other unfair manoeuvres, rather than to create the conditions that would help them escape from their sorry state.

The concept of civil society

The concept of civil society is a very ambiguous one. It often crops up at both national and international level, as a way of modernising the language, implying that we all belong to one big family, without changing social situations and differences in any way. The expression is not incompatible with the unique capitalist orthodoxy which polarises the world into a small minority of the rich and the super-rich, and a growing majority of the poor and poorest. It is very often used to smooth over social differences.

There is now an abusive use of the concept of "civil society" in Haiti, which makes it hard to see the true social reality. The currents of opinion that use it emphasise the geographical notion of "a people", while downplaying the social, political and economic situation of the diverse elements that make it up. Such currents include the way the application of neoliberalism is encouraged, with its prescriptions of structural change, or the call for less and less State intervention, in a country like ours where the State has

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[19] from the Spanish verb *comprar*: to buy. A commercial rather than manufacturing bourgeoisie.

always refused to regard the majority of its citizens in a normal way! The welfare state has never existed in Haiti and those who are demanding less State involvement in society are pushing at an open door! So to avoid any confusion we prefer to speak of a *société civile d'en bas*, or **grassroots civil society.**

CONTRIBUTIONS FROM NECKER DESSABLES[20]

Necker Dessables and the Centre Développement et Civilisations – Lebret-Irfed have known each other a long time. He was a student at IRFED[21] in the 1960s, and has stayed in touch with the network ever since.

An indefatigable traveller around the world, in his youth he got to know Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe when it was divided by the cold war. He was in particular both a player and a witness when the category of the Third World arrived on the international scene, and of the spirit of the Bandung conference in 1955. Having benefited from international networks of solidarity, he became an active militant in these networks in his turn, at both local and international level.

After a long period in Senegal, where he led a development project, Necker returned to Haiti and helped give the Commission Nationale Justice et Paix [National Justice and Peace Commission] its character as a social movement, which is now established in all regions of the country.

Necker, who knew Louis-Joseph Lebret and Karl Lévêque personally, was able to take his place at the Gressier workshop as the senior figure. His convictions, successes and failures, subject to constant reflection and analysis, gave the workshop an especial scope. On many occasions his contributions shed a specific light on the debate, stressing two themes in particular:

- the peasant farmers' state of exclusion. Going back a few decades, he gave the example of the contemptuous attitude shown by the administration towards rural people when they came into town on administrative business, to find themselves sent home again because they could only speak Creole. Although he noted some improvement in this kind of behaviour, he felt vigilance was still needed against instances of injustice towards them;

- work on training and educating the people is indispensable and must be continuously updated. This work can produce profound changes in individual and collective behaviour, and give everyone the chance to take part in building not just a country but a world in which justice is paramount!

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[20] Necker Dessables is Ombudsman and Director of the Office de la Protection du Citoyen [Ombudsman's Office].
[21] Institut de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Développement Harmonisé [International Training and Research Centre for Development]. He studied on the course that had been set up by Father Lebret in 1958 to train development managers, particularly in the newly independent countries.

ANNEXE 4

STATE AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
Summary of further contributions

Aurelio Alonso[22], the delegate from Cuba, brought the following points to participants' attention:

Small projects and national framework

The distinction between the macro scale (the nation) and the micro scale (local human communities). The State should pay attention to both levels. The role of the organisations present here is to connect the two. They must be careful not to get bogged down in small projects that distract them from the essential issues. Small projects must play a part in a national framework, combining the local with the national, and setting the short term in the long term.

Poverty and lack of protection

The concepts of poverty and lack of protection (*desamparo*, in Spanish) are closely connected. However, they do not mean precisely the same thing. We speak of poverty to describe a state of deprivation that defines our place in the strata of an unequal society, while we speak of lack of protection (in this case, meaning an abandonment of responsibility on the part of the State), to refer to a relationship between the State and civil society, the community, the family, or individuals.

It is impossible to break the cycle of poverty while this lack of protection of the population by the public authorities remains. Speaking of social justice means challenging this situation of abandonment. In other words, putting pressure on the State to institute policies that will tackle the causes and mechanisms of poverty, rather than measures such as assistance, which merely lessen it.

Representative democracy and participative democracy

Representative democracy, such as we know it in practice, is not really democracy. It represents a society of exploitation, inequality and domination. It is the democracy of the ruling classes and for the ruling classes. So participative democracy seems to be essential to complement or even substitute for representative democracy. However, it does not exist fully. We may speak of it as a project or a hope, but there is no historical reference because it has not become fully established anywhere. We can only rely on isolated instances.

Furthermore, we should not see these models as contradictory at the theoretical level. Participative democracy does not exclude representation, but it subordinates it and must make use of it.

We can recognise examples of democratic participation that have shown their worth and we can fight to have them adopted as part of the representative system. For instance, the primacy of collective authority over individual authority, the obligation on elected representatives to submit accounts to their electors, or the revocability of elected representatives if the electors consider that they are not fulfilling the mandate they were given.

Popular movements and representative democracy

The popular movement has succeeded in getting some of its principles adopted in some places, especially at the local level. However, the principles have often been reduced to formalities that have little effect. Not only is the legal success limited, but the people are not sufficiently politically aware. They must learn to use these legal means effectively in order to promote democracy.

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[22] Deputy Director of the journal *Casa de las Américas.*
[House of the Americas]

It has been proven that the capitalist system can live without democracy. We could even say it has invented a democracy without democracy, in which the capitalist market has succeeded in regulating all social relationships. On the other hand, the collapse of the 20th Century socialist experiment shows that socialism cannot be built without democracy.

Nevertheless, we have no choice but to use the tools that contemporary bourgeois democracy offers. In the last few years in Latin America we have seen the liberal representative electoral system take Chavez to the presidency of Venezuela and keep him there. He is perhaps the most ratified elected representative in history, because the bourgeois opposition itself used the means of representation – taken to the extreme – to try to get rid of him, but failed in the attempt.

It also enabled the people to lift Evo Morales to the responsibility of Head of State in Bolivia. These are cases where the most radical social change is envisaged; we have also seen Lula come to power in Brazil, Kirchner in Argentina, and others again, who have little in common with the interests of the local bourgeoisie and the empire. In other words, there are tools that can be used in existing democratic systems, even if they are tainted by cronyism and corruption. And the people, the social movements, and civil society do discover them and use them.

Towards the construction of a participative democracy

Building a participative democracy cannot therefore be a question of devising a scheme and applying it in one fell swoop. It cannot be planned like this. But gradually, settings can be created in which the interests of the people can be represented, instead of perpetuating the logic of capitalist profit, poverty and inequality. We must work harder to build democracy from the grassroots upwards, creating mutual support mechanisms for subsistence and collective decision-making at the local level. It will always be a complex process, which must always reflect practical realities, urgent needs and predetermined priorities, and cannot be achieved by slotting in an abstract model.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SOME INTRODUCTORY ASPECTS

PRESENTATION BY MARCOS NÚÑEZ [23]

Before handing over to Manuel Gil to tell of his experience as a local elected representative, Marcos Núñez gave an introduction to civil society in the Dominican Republic, based on five characteristic aspects:

Internal governance

The country exists in a context of extreme violence and petty crime, which stem from imbalance and the unequal distribution of assets. Corruption in the State and private sector increases poverty. The State's weakness in the area of justice arouses intense debate.

Constitutional reform

There is an intention in the government to modernise the executive. This modernisation is conceived in terms of adjusting the country to the demands of the market, globalisation and neo-liberalism. It will bring the country's laws into line with the FTA (Free Trade Agreement with the United States, Central America and the Caribbean). These changes are supported by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Paris Club.

Communication

The idea of well-being is sold to create a current of public opinion ready to accept the logic of the market, which influences the way people think. Lack of access to the wealth needed for consumption is denied, for instance by the apparent ease of winning the lottery: from being poor, you can become rich. This has a great influence on the young, who form gangs and become involved in petty crime, looking for easy money.

Openness to participation

Independent candidates have been able to stand for local election in the Dominican Republic since 1994. The country is now experiencing decentralisation accompanied by a certain budgetary commitment: 8% of the national budget actually goes to the municipalities and this is supposed to be increasing. There is a real movement towards ensuring that decentralisation is respected.

Migration policy

The massive presence of Haitians, many of them without legal status, has divided the country into sectors that are anti-Haitian, and those that understand that the destinies of the two countries are united. Every month, together with 10 other NGOs in Dominican Republic, the CEDEE runs a workshop on the current situation in Haiti and relations between the two countries.

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[23] Director of the CEDEE, Centro Dominicano de Estudios de la Educación [Dominican Centre for Educational Studies]

PRESENTATION BY MANUEL GIL, A LOCAL OFFICIAL ELECTED AS A RESULT OF PARTICIPATION BY CIVIL SOCIETY

The experience of an elected representative from the popular movement

Without popular education we would certainly not be able to be here. I am a product of popular education! This is an isolated experience, in a local context, and is the result of popular education.

It was thanks to the important work of:
- the Centro Dominicano de Estudios de la Educación (CEDEE) [Dominican Centre for Educational Studies];
- the Unión de Juventud Ecumenica Dominicana (UJEDO) [Dominican Ecumenical Youth Union];
- and thanks to the involvement of the Catholic Church with peasant families' associations of men, women, and young people;
that we became involved, and were able to take charge of the struggle to claim and seek better living conditions for the people in our communities.

From the late 1970s to the early 90s, we showed what we could achieve, working alongside the people, to insist that the State accept the responsibilities placed on it by the expectations of society. Towards the end of this important stage, we were subject to all kinds of criticism from the very people we had mobilised, which grew out of the activism we had been pursuing. They were saying "it's all very well to insist on things; why aren't we setting our sights on positions of public authority?"

All this led us:
- to reflect;
- to come to a decision, in other words to form an independent political movement with the aim of entering local government;
- to participate: although there was now little time to complete the administrative procedures required by electoral law, we managed to take part in the 1994 elections as the Movimiento Independiente de Yaguate (MIYA) [Yaguate Independent Movement].

First attempt (1994-1998): failure

Although we did not win the election, it was a very worthwhile experience, which encouraged us to carry on. Our movement came third, beating one of the country's traditional parties: the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) [Dominican Liberation Party].
Four years later, after more profound consideration, we decided to take part via a strategic alliance with one of the traditional parties, which represented the strongest political force at the time: the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) [Dominican Revolutionary Party].

Second attempt (1998-2002): success, and a step forward

Through this strategic alliance, we managed to win a place in local government (public authority).

Development and participative management

- We began with openness and community participation in organisations;
- Decisions were taken by the people, organised via the Consejo de Regidores (town council);
- We based our work on specific problems, requests and needs; we established priorities and worked to find a solution;
- We drew up a participative budget based on organised sectors.

By developing prudent management, we earned the recognition of a State body working on the theme of "Decentralisation and Modernisation of the State".

After the strategic alliance broke down half way through the period, we stepped up the pace of improvements in management, and decided to take part in the next electoral campaign (which took place in 2002-2006) on our own, as a popular movement.

To sum up

The predominant political model swallowed us up, resulting in a sharp drop in our participation in the process.

It's only now that we can reap what we have sown for the benefit of communities: representation by an elected representative or *regidor* on the Council, and the huge task of seeking to correct the mistakes that have been made.

In conclusion, I would like to cite two paragraphs from the Public Forum on "Popular education today: advances and challenges", held by the Consejo de Educación de Adultos de América Latina (CEAAL) [Latin American Council for Adult Education]:

"Reflection on the subject of popular education is intimately linked to a radical perspective of democratising democracy.

It requires new creative forms of participation that enable a new social contract to be drawn up between the State and Society; to achieve this we have to go beyond the predominant logic in the relationship between the State and the people, one that is steeped in apathy, cronyism, submission, populism and other perverse effects of this cultural heritage.

This is why opening up new forms and channels of participation requires a planned approach to education, one that can guide the essential process of changing attitudes, values, mentalities, behaviours, and procedures, both among the people and among those who are part of the State apparatus."

[Translator's note: translated from the French text provided, not a direct quotation.]

ANNEXE 6
DECENTRALISATION IN HAITI

CONTRIBUTION FROM JEAN RENOL ELIE[24]

The mechanisms of decentralisation

Clear distinctions must be drawn between a series of concepts used in the Haitian constitution, such as :
"relocation", [25] "industrial decompartmentalisation", [26] "deconcentration", [27] and "decentralisation" [28]. According to Article 87.4 of the Constitution, decentralisation goes hand in hand with deconcentration of services and with industrial decompartmentalisation to benefit the geographical departments.

Decentralisation and levels of decision-making

Decentralisation suggests that decisions may be taken locally, at either communal section, commune, or departmental level, thus benefiting local citizens. In encouraging local decision-making, decentralisation neither does away with nor diminishes central power. Neither does it prevent a series of decisions from being taken at central level. So it is important both to know which decisions can be taken at each level of local government concerned, and also to ask how many people take the decisions. Are they taken by one person, by a small group of local people, or by the citizens of the locality? Decisions taken locally by one person or by a small group do not help us make progress. On the other hand, if they are taken by the local citizens they become a framework that encourages the citizens of the locality in question to take part in the affairs of the State at local level.

In other words it is a framework on which real democracy can be built.

Civic decision-making and local democracy

In the framework usually put forward for representative democracy, the individual is a citizen only on election day: once they have elected their representative, they cease to exercise their role as citizen. In this respect, representative democracy alone cannot be a true democracy. In a true democracy, the individual is not a citizen only on election day. A real democracy requires a series of channels through which the citizen can give their opinion, or even make decisions about all matters affecting their community.

Opportunities for participation written into the Constitution

The last paragraph of the preamble to the 1987 Constitution explains that the whole population must take part in all decisions that concern the country's future, so that decentralisation will be effective and in everyone's interest. The Constitution of Haiti therefore proposes a participative democracy. This does not prevent there being representatives, but representation is not enough. So it is important to reflect on and even insist on a participative democracy that will enable every one of us to remain a citizen both during and after the electoral period. Everyone will be able to express themselves and take part freely in the affairs of their community. The Haitian Constitution sets out at least the broad outlines of participative democracy, which is a framework in which participation for all can be constructed.

Local government in Haiti

Articles 61 to 87 cover everything to do with local government. By "local government" we mean an area managed by the

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[24] Jean Renol Elie, decentralisation specialist.
[25] Moving a business from one place to another.
[26] Making it possible for industrial activities to be spread across different geographical departments of the country.
[27] Deconcentrating State-provided services.
[28] Relating to the transfer of power to the local level in order to promote local governance.

citizens who live there, in other words an area in which the citizens play an active role in everything to do with that area's future. To manage it, they themselves choose a council which will take care of the administration of the community, and which is responsible for holding regular meetings with the local residents. The area must have enough autonomy to deal with everything affecting it. It must exist in accordance with Constitution, as an authority tasked with channelling citizens' participation and the decisions taken at each tier of government. These authorities are the Assemblies. There must be one for each of the three levels of local government: the Assemblée de Section Communale [Communal Section Assembly], the Assemblée Communale [Communal Assembly] and the Assemblée Départementale [Departmental Assembly]. Each level has its own functions and limits. What makes it rather complex is that the communal sections are part of the communes and the communes are part of the department. It is important to distinguish clearly between the relationships among them, on the one hand, and on the other the relationship between each community level and the central level.

Knowing the framework for decentralisation

The decrees that relate to decentralisation must take account of the 1987 Constitution. Organised civil society (particularly the various organisations and associations) needs to be able to think critically together with the people of the community, to improve understanding of the role of each tier of government, of the relationship between them, and of how local government should be constructed. Civil society is actually the first to benefit from decentralisation. So it must mobilise the local citizens via the organisations and make them aware of decentralisation.

Central government resistance

Although decentralisation is a framework that makes it easier for everyone to participate, and makes true democracy possible, Government officials are not always interested in decentralisation because they are afraid of losing their "code of power", which is a function of the way they understand the notion of power in Haiti. However, the decentralisation question needs to be understood in a different way: it will enable officials to concentrate on their essential work instead of spending time on local problems that people at local government level could resolve.

Citizens' demands, legislation and the national plan

It was clear from various demands made well before the 1987 Constitution that the people were hungry for participation. When these demands become law, it is not always in the form that might be desired. Organisation leaders have a responsibility to work together with the people to analyse whether their demands have been taken into consideration in the way they were presented.

When taking decisions at local level, it is also important to avoid falling into a way of thinking that conflicts with the national dynamic. For instance, if each communal section has its own foreign partner, and functions within a limited framework, there is a risk of creating a patchwork of communal sections which do not reflect the national dynamic. The broad direction of decisions at each level of local government must fit into a programme of national development.

At present there is talk of a new social contract, but our best social contract is the 1987 Constitution, which represents a vital gain. Any other social contract must be compatible with the Haitian Constitution, otherwise we risk losing all the advantages it already offers us.

CONTRIBUTION FROM ANDRE LAFONTANT JOSEPH[29]

A new legal framework

M. Joseph has worked at the interim government's Ministry of the Interior and Local Government, in particular in the Unit for the Decentralisation of Port-au-Prince. In charge of policy on "Institutional strengthening and decentralisation", he soon became aware that it was impossible to give decentralisation any impetus if there was no legal framework setting out the powers of each territorial entity. He set himself the task of devising and developing a draft framework decree for the decentralisation process. Given that there was no Parliament during this transition period,[30] he had to consult the *Conseil des Sages* [Council of Elders] which was granted by consensus the power to deliberate and express an opinion on the activities and projects of the Executive.

Public debate and passing of the law

This first draft of the decree was opened to public debate. Several approaches were used to launch a national debate on the question of decentralisation and particularly on this draft decree. The draft was distributed to as many people, institutions and groups of organisations interested in the decentralisation issue as possible. It was distributed on the Internet, for those with access, and an Internet debate was also opened. To prompt dialogue and participation among interested organisations, three more formal workshops were organised around the framework decree, building on a neighbourhood approach and starting with a workshop in the North bringing together the organisations in the region, a second one in the South of the country, and a third in the Centre. This opened up a broad discussion around the main themes covered in the decree. Several corrections were made to the first draft decree as a result of this participative process. The third and final draft, which reflected the various discussions at the

three workshops, was submitted to each of the ministers for their reactions. With each minister's responses taken into account, the final version was presented by the Minister of the Interior to the Council of Ministers and was passed by the Council. However, a minor problem in the transitional government meant this decree on decentralisation could not be published in the Haitian government's official journal, *Le Moniteur*, during that government's mandate. However, representations are being made to the new government in order to have it promulgated.

Decrees and territoriality

Following on from this framework decree, four other decrees were drawn up dealing with the department, the commune, the communal section, and local government service. Taken as a whole these decrees establish:

• decentralisation as a **mode of functioning** that aims to ensure all the basic services required by the people work effectively. In fact, a whole series of parameters demonstrates that the central State is very poorly placed to supply these services directly and effectively throughout the country;

• that citizens living in the territorial divisions (localities, communal sections and communes), have a **right to the services of the State** themselves, without distinctions being drawn. Studies have been conducted to plan how administrative competencies should be distributed between the tiers of local government so as to make local elected representatives responsible for services in their local area;

• that decentralisation is seen not only as a politico-administrative exercise but also as a **democratic tool**. This means that the policies are drawn up in a spirit of **participative democracy,** while strategies are defined and a local development plan implemented. Earlier experience of local governance showed that if there is a framework for concertation between the local elected representatives and the local inhabitants, via organised

[29] André Lafontant Joseph, decentralisation specialist
[30] March 2004 to February 2006

civil society, some projects will be much easier to implement, even in a very difficult political context: decisions are more effective; the population is readier to participate with less conflict because it is better informed, and projects are easier to carry out. Instead of thinking the State should be a milch-cow that takes all the decisions, as is the current tendency, **citizens** will have a new attitude towards their locality: they become **the prime mover in their own development** at all levels, the communal section, the commune and the department.

Key issues and the distribution of administrative competencies

The **distribution of administrative competencies** between the central State and local government was studied in depth. There is now a growing current of opinion which suggests that transferring too many competencies to local government officials should be avoided, given their poor management. According to this opinion, the institutions must be strengthened before competencies are transferred. A law or a decree that sets out a framework and rules cannot be implemented overnight. However, they can be regarded as an asset thanks to which the poorest people can acquire rights, with the creation of settings in which democracy really works. So they will be able to defend their rights and fight to make sure these laws are respected. Decentralisation is a power struggle between the central State, a conservative, centralising force, and the people, who benefit from the decentralisation dynamic. Our job is to turn what the decree says into reality. Unless society joins in the fight, it will be very difficult to apply the decree. The question of the communal administrative police, which is regarded as a community police force, functioning at the level of communal sections and communes, is dealt with in the decree as a whole. The five different decrees give details of the overall general direction of decentralisation across the territorial divisions.

Awareness-raising with local elected representatives and civil society

With his research group, M. Lafontant is now taking advantage of this legal framework to work on pilot schemes such as training candidates for local elections, and a training and support programme for local elected representatives in the exercise of their duties. Candidates and local elected representatives must be able to familiarise themselves with these new decrees and also become more aware of their duties. The pilot scheme also includes a project to raise awareness among people in organised local civil society about the need for decentralisation, their responsibility and the relationship that they can build up with local elected representatives. The basic idea is to introduce a new dynamic between organised civil society and the candidates, local elected representatives who more often than not do not know their duties.

ANNEXE 7
CHANGES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN REGIONAL CONTEXT

CONTRIBUTION FROM JORGE BALBIS

The characteristics of Haiti are such that Latin America does not understand what goes on there, and the reverse is also true. However, Latin America and the Caribbean have inherited the same history and suffer from the same problems of under-development.

1960 – 1970:

We have taken as the starting point for our analysis the crisis and breakdown of the national people's state. This model of the state was an important presence in most Latin American societies in the first half of the 20th Century. In it, economic development was based on an import substitution model and was accompanied by political pluralism, social democratisation and modernisation.

The aim of this model was to develop the internal market and growth in employment, especially as far as public service employees and industrial workers are concerned. Although it did not go far enough, it produced a better distribution of the nation's wealth (more widespread education), some development of the middle classes, and the birth of trade unions and social pacts. On the other hand, it led to excessive urbanisation, accompanied by the appearance of poverty belts around towns and cities.
The little progress that was seen in democracy, development and social integration remained incomplete, and the rural world in particular was unable to benefit from the changes.

This socio-political model has always been subject to contradictions and opposition, which became more radical in the 1960s and 70s, at a time when it was no longer possible to preserve the precarious balance, both internal and external, on which it depended. In this respect it seems clear that this formula was not able to overcome the inertia generated by its own functioning. In particular, there came a time when it was unable to respond to social demands, which were getting stronger and harder to satisfy every time, against a background of ideological radicalisation and constantly worsening economic stagnation.

Faced with the exhaustion of the development model (substitutive industrialisation) on which it is based, confronted with the breakdown of the coalitions of social and political forces that had made its dynamism possible, and held in check by the ideological confrontation that was gradually radicalising the Latin American continent, the classic socio-economic scenario was unable to overcome the social crisis of the 1970s and the breakdown of political regimes besieged by alternative models from the grassroots (basism, guerrilla movements, etc.) or the sphere of leadership (militarism, technocracy etc).

In 1959, the Cuban revolution left its mark, producing an expansion of the revolutionary model. An increase in demands was seen, and outbreaks of violence (in Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay etc). Faced with these various changes, the people's state model reached its limits, and was unable to respond to the contradictory demands it had itself generated. Left and right engaged in a violent confrontation, with each side trying to eliminate the other, and blaming it for a crisis that was inherent in a moribund political system.

This breakdown of the Latin American states came at the time of the Cold War, in which Cuba was one of the representatives of the communist threat.

The United States, under Kennedy, then intervened via the Alliance for Progress, which suggested changes intended to avoid the breakup of the national people's state model and the development of communism. However, the Kennedy doctrine ended in failure.

1970 – 1990

The crisis caused a violent break away from the democratic model. Military regimes appeared, together with dictatorships (in Haiti, under dictatorship from 1957, Brazil from 1964, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala), or in the form of "New Authoritarianism" (in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia).

The support of the United States enabled dictators to introduce the doctrine of national security, which was intended to overcome the crisis engendered by the national people's state, but would also completely dismantle this state model, which was structured around a balance between the government, the political parties and society. The dictatorship model replaced regulation achieved through relations between the State, the political field, and social action, with regulation operated by the market and technocratic reasoning, to which corporatist trading was soon added.

Fifteen years of repression did not solve the problems inherited from the old state model, and the influence of neo-liberalism from the United States began to make itself felt. The dictatorships then adopted the neoliberal economic model: privatisation, deregulation, opening of markets, promotion of foreign investment, macroeconomic structural adjustments, and a radical redistribution of wealth from which the lower and middle classes were excluded.

This new model of society presupposes that the distribution of national wealth operates through the interplay of market forces, without any regulatory intervention from the State. The concentration of wealth should make investment possible, and this in its turn should contribute to job creation and thus to new wealth creation, resulting in a new distribution of the nation's wealth. However, although they succeeded in destroying some mechanisms that were specific to the national people's state, the authoritarian regimes did not manage to create the conditions required to build and maintain a new relationship between social, political and economic forces.

1980 – 1990

After the fall of the dictatorships, a process of democratisation was established. Twenty years later, the consequences of the military regimes are still present, including some traces in the constitutions (such as the amnesty laws in certain countries).This return towards democracy is a long and difficult process, driven by groups that belong to civil society and by political parties (for instance, human rights organisations that struggle to get round the amnesty laws, especially in the case of missing children).

In this context, some countries are trying to restore, at least partially, a national people's state model. But these attempts end in failure, confirming the need for a restructuring of the previous model. This need is the greater because of the general economic downturn that occurred at the time of the 1982 financial crisis. In that same year, Mexico stopped paying its foreign debt, followed by Argentina and Brazil.

The collapse of the Latin American economies, sparked by the foreign debt crisis, wiped out forever those elements of the national people's state model that had survived because the military regimes had not got rid of them or because they had been maintained in the countries that escaped authoritarianism.
It was at the beginning of the crisis that the development model, based on accumulation and growth, began to be questioned. This marks, incidentally, a turn towards a policy of structural adjustment that is typical of neoliberalism. Along with most of

the rest of the world, the continent then abandoned the post-war global development policies aimed at safeguarding the balance between political, social and economic forces. In this context of increasing globalisation and market-friendly development strategies, to use the World Bank expression, most Latin American countries adopted the transition to liberalism, despite strong resistance due to the high social cost.

The reappearance of the concept of decentralisation

At the same time, the Washington Consensus (a proposal drawn up by the international finance bodies – the IMF and the World Bank – the United States government, and the Latin American elites) marked the final disappearance of the 1960s model of society, and resulted in the full and systematic application of the neoliberal model: reform of public administration (reducing the cost of the State); predominance of the market (deregulation, privatisation, private investment and foreign capital); encouragement of civil society participation in the public sector; and decentralisation of traditionally centralist States.

According to neoliberal logic, decentralisation enables the role of the State to be reduced, by delegating to the private sector the local provision of basic services to the population.

The example of primary and secondary state education in Chile highlights the perverse effects of a transfer of administrative competencies from the State to the local level, if it is not accompanied by the allocation of a portion of the national budget. The inequality of resources between one municipality and another affects teaching quality, so well-off families enrol their children in private schools. But access to university is by examination, and only those who can afford private education can get into higher education. Introducing the logic of the market into state education creates a mechanism by which education reproduces social inequality. Organisations are now working towards changing this system.

The consequences of this neoliberal model threaten democratisation

We should recall that the 1960s model of the State provided access to social security, child protection, old-age pensions, and unemployment benefit, with financing guaranteed to a greater or lesser extent by the distribution of wealth across social classes. In the neoliberal model of the State, on the other hand, these essential services are privatised. For instance, provision for old age operates through individual capitalisation, in which individuals take out insurance with private pension funds. However, when these are subject to the rules of the market, especially stock exchange valuation, they can fail, causing pensioners to lose their contingency funds.

In the national people's state model, political forces rule and organise the social domain and the market. Through elections, political forces generate dynamics and balances, and use them to authorise changes in direction and choice of society. In the neoliberal model, the market is the authority that governs politics and the social arena, resulting in notable imbalances. For instance, the State no longer guarantees the security of the citizens; instead, it is privatised. In Costa Rica, where there is in fact very little insecurity, we are seeing a sense of fear appearing. The wealthy are afraid of the poor, and to protect themselves they employ other people who are just as poor. Fed by the media, the exploitation of a sense of fear ends up by destroying the social fabric.

1990 – 2000

These conflicting economic and social processes lead to the paradox of an economic growth (control of the effects of the 1982 debt crisis, substantial increase in GDP, positive flow of foreign capital into the region) that is integrated into the world economy, but accompanied by a reinforcement of inequality.

We should add that some countries have seen their foreign debt doubled. It is proven that unless there is a political

desire for social redistribution, and unless a sustainable national production capacity is reinforced, growth does not serve development.

Globalisation, foreign debt and sovereignty

Even without military occupation, the sovereignty of Latin American countries is threatened, for the following reasons:
- the stock exchange: its fluctuations in western countries have a strong influence on local economies;
- foreign capital: a one-point increase in interest rates in the USA draws in foreign capital invested in Latin America, causing a collapse in the local economy;
- foreign debt: in most Latin American countries, paying it involves disproportionate excess costs compared to the State budget (the nation's wealth is not reinvested in the country's productive capacity). And if the country does not pay, it is put on a "blacklist" and denied access to the international financial resources of the World Bank, the IMF, etc. The paradox is that some countries get into debt so they can continue receiving international financial aid.

Discrediting the very principle of democracy

In the neoliberal system, citizens no longer feel protected. They no longer trust the political parties, the government, or the State. This is how the logic of every man for himself becomes established, with its tendency to discredit democratic institutions. Worsening poverty, growing inequality in the distribution of income, and inequality between men and women on the labour market all feed the region's chronic political instability.

Even the notion of democracy itself is in free fall, when structural adjustment policies weaken the State's ability to guarantee access for all to essential goods and services, and to act to correct social problems.
"How much poverty can democracy tolerate? If the democratic institutions do not soon produce economic and social results that benefit the majority, to bridge the gulf between rich and poor and reduce the gap between modernity and tradition, then we may fear a return to our oldest and most deeply-rooted tradition: authoritarianism."[31]

A sombre prospect, but a few glimmers of hope

Civil society organisations are very active at local level, organising themselves to acquire rights (such as economic, social, cultural and human rights) and to promote new modes of production and consumption (cooperative movements, etc). The challenge is to act beyond the local level, on global trends.

It is possible to establish progressive political alliances starting from grassroots social movements: the electoral success of the Workers' Party in Brazil is the result of work that has been going on for more than 15 years. However, in a highly concentrated society, a newly elected government faces very real limits on what it can do. This highlights the difficulty of managing the post-election period. Coming to power is a long, difficult stage for a progressive movement, but changing the structures of the State is another one, just as complex, and there is a risk that the mechanisms that create inequality and political instability will be reproduced. The case of Lula is a good illustration: acceding to the presidency does not mean acceding to power. And it is not those social classes that raised him to power that will soon re-elect him, but other sectors of society.

In Bolivia, will Evo Morales manage to create the progressive alliances needed to change the structures that reproduce the causes of poverty and dependency?

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[31] Carlos FUENTES: from "Democracia latinoamericana: anhelo, realidad y amenaza", [Latin American democracy: desire, reality and threat] *Bitácora* supplement, La República, Montevideo, 14 June 2001, p. 16. [Translator's note: translated from the French text provided, not a direct quotation.]

In conclusion, analysing these processes of change that are under way in the region illustrates the challenge of modernity in Latin America: to find a model of development that will enable the countries of the continent to take their place stably and relatively autonomously in the world system, and that will generate the material foundation for a process of social democratisation, an ethical condition and an inseparable dimension of political democracy.

Some regional characteristics connected with local development in Haiti (decentralisation, local social participation)

In Central America

- weakened by structural adjustment policies, the State centralises decision making and budgeting. Without reform, local development is impossible;
- the relationships between local government and the central State do not produce governance. The frameworks for participation and transparency are not there;
- outside election periods, there is a clear absence of dialogue between the government and the electors;
- elected representatives regard their mandate as a property from which they must extract maximum profit, not as a job to serve the common good. This situation encourages corruption.

In the Southern Cone

- the parties of the Left distrust decentralisation, despite talking about it positively.
- In their eyes, only the central State is authorised to deal with development issues; this is inherited from the 1960s concept of the State;
- they fail to distinguish between decentralisation and a neoliberal plan (in which there is no delegation of the national budget).
- there is a high risk of a decrease in popular mobilisation if citizens' participation does not result in economic and social changes, or a fair sharing of improved living standards.

In the Andean region

The different parties involved in decentralisation must work together under the guidance of a national political plan, otherwise it may become part of the process by which inequality is reinforced. For instance, in Bolivia, rich areas call for decentralisation in order to preserve their wealth.

All these factors exist in Haiti too. For the peoples' organisations in civil society, taking part in networks that share experiences and implement joint projects is one of the ways in which they can seek alternative routes towards equitable development.